With substantial fixed costs of drug development, more common conditions can support more products. If additional pharmaceutical products are beneficial, they will attract greater consumption and promote better health, e.g. greater longevity. We ask how market size -measured by condition prevalence -affects consumption and longevity. We document in condition cross sections that both the tendency to use a drug and longevity are higher for individuals with more prevalent conditions. We also make use of the 1983 Orphan Drug Act (ODA), which promoted development of drugs for the treatment of rare conditions. Both prescription drug consumption and longevity of people with rare diseases has increased more, since the ODA, than prescription drug consumption and longevity of people with common diseases.
their condition is more common. More succinctly, we ask whether "misery loves company."
Despite the novelty of the academic question of the welfare of small consumer groups in markets, concern about this issue is not new to policy makers. The possibility that small populations would see few medications developed for their conditions led the US Congress to pass the 1983 Orphan Drug Act (ODA), giving firms special incentives to develop drugs for diseases afflicting fewer than 200,000 Americans. 5 The ODA contains provisions that reduce the cost, and raise the appropriability, of research on rare diseases. First, under the Act drugs approved as orphan drugs (for conditions affecting fewer than 200,000 persons), drug makers get seven years of exclusive marketing upon FDA approval. According to the FDA, this is the "most sought incentive." For seven years following FDA approval, the FDA cannot approve another drug for the same indication without the sponsor's consent. Second, drug makers qualify for a tax credit for clinical research expense of up to 50 percent of clinical testing expense (see http://www.fda.gov/orphan/taxcred.htm). In addition the FDA provides grant support for investigation of rare disease treatments (see http://www.fda.gov/orphan/grants/info.htm).
Together, these provisions a) increase effective market size, and b) reduced fixed (sunk)
costs. In doing so, the Act provides a natural experiment for measuring the impact of increased market size, relative to fixed costs, on product development, consumption, and welfare.
According to the FDA , the ODA has had a large effect on drug development:"ODA has been very successful -more than 200 drugs and biological products for rare diseases have been brought to market since 1983. In contrast, the decade prior to 1983 saw fewer than ten such products come to market." 6 A comp lete list of the drugs that have been granted Orphan Drug Status by the FDA is provided in Appendix Table 1 . 7 Figure 1 shows the cumulative number of orphan and non-orphan drugs approved, 1979-1998, as a percent of the cumulative number of drugs approved in 1979. Between 1979 and 1983, the number of orphan drugs increased at about the same rate as the number of other drugs. By 1998, there were more than five times as many orphan drugs as there had been in 1979, and fewer than twice as many non-orphan drugs.
In light of the apparent effect of the ODA on drug development, we examine its effect on two measures related to welfare, consumption and mortality. First, we ask whether there is evidence, in the pharmaceutical context, that misery loves company. We compare across conditions with different levels of prevalence ("market size"), asking 6 Source: http://www.fda.gov/orphan/History.htm. 7 Some of these drugs also have non-orphan indications, i.e. they may be used to treat common diseases.
whether physicians are more likely to prescribe drugs for common diseases, and whether people with common diseases are likely to live longer. Results from this approach are highly suggestive: more prevalent conditions have substantially more products available, and we document both that larger affected populations are much more likely to take a drug and that mortality rates are lower for persons with more common conditions. A shortcoming of this approach, however, is the possibility of unobserved heterogeneity leading both to large markets and many drugs. Putting this differently, the cross sectional measurement strategy may not provide a clean source of exogenous variation in market size.
Conveniently, the passage of the Orphan Drug Act provides a source of exogenous variation in market size, relative to fixed costs, for drugs targeting small populations. This motivates our second measurement approach for documenting the effect of market size on drug consumption and, by extension, welfare. We document growth in consumption and increases in longevity for individuals with less common conditions, relative to those with more common conditions. Moreover, we document that these effects on consumption and longevity are significantly related to Orphan Drug use for the condition.
The paper proceeds in four sections. Section 1 provides background by outlining the mechanism for preference externalities. We also review relevant literature. Section 2 describes the data used in this study. Sectio n 3 presents our empirical strategy and results. We find clear cross sectional evidence that misery loves company, both before and after the Orphan Drug Law. But the Law appears to have weakened the link between market size and welfare. Conditions with substantial Orphan Drug use have larger increases in consumption and longevity than others. In the conclusion we consider our results in both narrow and broad contexts.
I.
Market Size, Entry, and Welfare: Why Would Misery Love Company?
This paper is mainly concerned with the positive question of how market size affects drug development, consumption, and other measures of welfare. Still, it is helpful to locate this problem in its normative context, which we briefly do below.
When development carries sunk costs and products are imperfect substitutes, markets can fail to achieve optimal outcomes. 8 First, if sellers cannot appropriate the entire consumer valuation of their product, some products with consumer valuation in excess of their production cost will not be developed. That is, inefficient under-provision is possible. At the same time, because products are substitutes, the private benefit of entry can exceed the social benefit if some of a product's business is diverted from other products. 9 For illustration, consider an additional identical product. It imposes its fixed cost on society, but adds no consumer benefit (except, possibly, reduced prices). It is possible, as a result, for markets to support inefficient overprovision of products with sufficient total demand to cover the costs of multiple products. Spence terms the process by which the market determines what to produce, "the product selection problem."
Some products that the market selects not to produce are candidates for the "inefficient underprovision" designation. Indeed, one can view the ODA as an attempt to 8 These problems are the subject of important theoretical papers by Spence (1976a,b) and Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) . 9 Lichtenberg and Philipson (2003) provide evidence that the present discounted value of a pharmaceutical innovator's returns is reduced more by competition from other brands ("creative destruction") prior to patent expiration than it is by competition from generic manufacturers after patent expiration.
remedy inefficient underprovision. In this case, the reason the allocation may be inefficient is presumably inability to price discriminate.
We envision firms introducing competing products as long as it is profitable to do so. Competing products are imperfect substitutes for one another. Different products in a category work best for different sorts of patients, so that additional products in a category may draw additional persons to consumption, thereby increasing welfare. A sufficient, although not necessary, condition for additional products to increase welfare is that additional products raise the tendency for patients to consume a drug in the category corresponding to their condition. We assume that drug development carries only fixed (sunk) costs. There is an intuitive relationship between the tendency to consume and welfare. The presence of more products creates greater potential for consumers to find a product closer to their ideal. Unless pricing extracts all surplus, consumer welfare is greater.
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The "business stealing vs. market expansion" distinction provides a helpful framework for viewing the relationship between consumption and welfare (see Mankiw and Whinston, 1986) . If a new drug is substantially differentiated, it may draw new customers into the market rather than simply diverting business from existing products.
In this case, the share of affected people consuming a drug will increase with entry. On the other hand, an undifferentiated product may draw all of its business from existing products and will therefore not increase the tendency to consume. Of course, additional 10 We recognize that a higher tendency to consume in a cross section does not necessarily reflect higher welfare. Welfare is not higher if 80 percent of people are barely willing to consume than if 79 percent of persons consume and derive substantial surplus. On the other hand, if the arrival of a new product (without withdrawal of existing products) raises the tendency to consume, then by revealed preference welfare is higher. We will treat consumption tendencies as suggestive evidence about welfare in the paper, paying particular attention to results from longitudinal measurement approaches.
products can put downward pressure on prices, and this pressure is presumably more acute as the products are less differentiated.
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In this scheme it is easy to see how misery loves company. An increase in market size raises the amount of revenue available to a product category, possibly justifying the development of an additional product. An additional product may attract a new customer (valuing the product above its price), whose use of the product generates some combination of consumer surplus and greater longevity. Furthermore, additional products may reduce the price paid by all customers.
The passage of the ODA increases the effective size of the market, relative to fixed costs, for drugs targeting uncommon conditions. This may give rise to more products in those categories, as well as a greater tendency to consume. Because rareconditions are targeted by few products, especially prior to the ODA, new products spurred by the ODA are likely to be strongly differentiated products; that is, their entry provides some product, as opposed to no product.
The foregoing suggests the following questions. Do larger markets attract more products? Is there a greater tendency to consume in markets with more products and/or lower prices? Do additional products promote longevity? We now turn to the empirical analysis of these questions.
II. Data
The basic data for this study are information on disease prevalence, prescription drug consumption, and longevity, by 3-digit ICD-9 disease code, in 1979 and 1998.
These observations occur before and fairly long after the 1983 ODA. In addition, we have information on the fraction of prescriptions written for orphan drugs between 1995 and 2000. Our data are drawn from two (three?) sources, which we describe below.
Physician Survey Data on Drug Consumption and Condition Prevalence
Our primary data on drug consumption and prevalence are drawn from a physician survey, the National Ambulatory Medical Care Surveys ( Each NAMCS office visit record reports the physician's diagnoses (usually only one), any drugs ordered, administered, or provided, and a sampling weight. We measure condition i's prevalence in a year based on the number of visits with primary diagnosis i.
In particular, we define:
N_VISIT_PRE i = the estimated annual number of office-based physician visits in which 3-digit ICD9 diagnosis i was recorded in the pre-ODA period (1980) (1981) 12 ; and N_VISIT_POST i = the estimated annual number of office-based physician visits in which 3-digit ICD9 diagnosis i was recorded in the post-ODA period (1997) (1998) .
12 NAMCS was conducted in 1980 NAMCS was conducted in , 1981 NAMCS was conducted in , 1985 NAMCS was conducted in , and annually since 1989 Thus, the NAMCS-based prevalence measure is based only on physician visits. The advantage of this sampling condition is that physician diagnoses are more likely than self-diagnoses to be correct. At the same time, this sampling has the possible disadvantage of excluding persons who are ill but do not seek medical care.
We measure drug consumption tendencies from prescription information in the NAMCS in two ways. Our first measure is whether patients diagnosed with a condition have one or more drugs prescribed for them. The "consumption" measure is therefore based not literally on consumption but rather whether the doctor believes beneficial drugs exist for the individual's circumstance. In particular, the fraction of visits with primary diagnosis i in which one or more drugs were prescribed as follows:
RX%_PRE i = visits in which any medications were prescribed as a fraction of total visits in which 3-digit ICD9 diagnosis i was recorded in the pre-ODA period (1980) (1981) ; and RX%_POST i = visits in which any medications were prescribed as a fraction of total visits in which 3-digit ICD9 diagnosis i was recorded in the post-ODA period (1997) (1998) .
Our second consumption measure is the average number of drugs prescribed per visit, by condition.
Longevity and Prevalence Data from Vital Statistics
Our data on longevity, as well as a second measure of prevalence, are drawn from Vital Statistics-Mortality Detail files. Two items that are recorded on death certificates are the cause of death, and the age at death. The number of (non-infant) deaths due to a condition is our second measure of prevalence. We measure longevity using the percent of people dying before age 55 (excluding infant deaths ) due to a condition.
Orphan Drug Use
The third piece of information for this study is a measure of Orphan Drug use.
We use the percent of 1995-2000 prescriptions, by 3-digit ICD-9 condition, that are for the Orphan Drugs listed in Appendix Table 1 . These data are drawn from NAMCS Table 1 
III. Empirical Strategy and Results

Empirical Strategy
Our goal in this paper is to measure the effect of market size on consumer welfare in drug markets, and we employ two empirical strategies. First, we exploit cross sectional comparisons across conditions with different levels of prevalence ("market size"), asking whether physicians are more likely to prescribe drugs to patients with more prevalent conditions. The inherent difficulty with this approach, however, is the possibility of unobserved heterogeneity leading both to large markets and many drugs.
Fortunately, the passage of the Orphan Drug Act provides a source of exogenous variation in market size for drugs targeting small populations. Using panel data at two points in time, along with a measure of Orphan Drug use, we can exploit this policy change to provide more compelling evidence of the effects of market size on consumption and mortality, than one might find using cross-sectional comparisons across medical conditions alone. As a useful byproduct of this approach, we can also simply examine the effectiveness of the Orphan Drug Act.
Prevalence and Consumption using Physician Survey Data
Do persons with more common conditions have a greater tendency to take a drug?
First, we estimate cross-condition relationships between the tendency to take a drug and condition prevalence, via the following equations:
where eq. (1) characterizes the pre-ODA period and eq. (2) It is possible that the cross sectional relationship between consumption and prevalence arises because of unobserved heterogeneity. Some factor determining consumption may be correlated with prevalence for reasons outside our explanation.
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Because we have consumption data at two points in time, we can eliminate the fixed unobservable by differencing. We can then test whether the change in consumption is larger for the conditions for which patients take orphan drugs. It is also possible that 13 For example, the measure of prevalence used in these regressions, doctor visits where a condition is diagnosed, may be driven by the known availability of particular medications (e.g. Viagra). Other measurement approaches we employ, including both longitudinal data and mortality-based prevalence measures, avoid these problems. Death is not endogenous in the same way as doctor visits. drug consumption is growing at different rates for conditions with different levels of prevalence. To avoid attributing a general prevalence effect to Orphan drug use we also include measures of condition prevalence in the regressions as follows:
where
Finally, we include regressions controlling for prevalence with dummies for prevalence quintiles according to 1979 MD visits. Table 3 Tables 4 and 5 revisit the relationships in table 2 
Mortality and Prevalence
Although product consumption is the usual economic measure underlying welfare inferences, the medical context provides other intuitive measures of welfare. We can use the Vital Statistics to examine the relationship between prevalence and longevity, as measured by the percent of persons, among those dying of a condition, dying before age 55. Our empirical approaches are analogous to those above. 
Discussion: the ODA's Effects and Context
The effects of the ODA are visible in a variety of ways in our results. Prior to the ODA, drug availability -and ensuing welfare -were quite sensitive to market size.
Misery really loved company. We see this primarily in the contrast between the pre and post-ODA estimates of the relationship between consumption and prevalence. The ODA increased the incentive for firms to develop drugs for small populations, relative to the incentive for larger populations. As a result, there was sharper growth in the drug consumption tendency in low-prevalence conditions than in more common conditions.
Similarly, there was a large decrease in mortality for low-prevalence conditions relative to higher-prevalence conditions. The ODA decreased the extent to which misery loves company. It is not clear whether these effects are efficient, although if the Act simply allows more complete appropriation of drug benefits, then there would be no reason to suspect inefficiency.
Most observers of the ODA applaud this policy precisely for its effect of reducing the dependence of welfare on market size. Intuitively, in the context of disease, it is not hard to understand the popula rity of this policy. Yet, the conditions facing would-be consumers of drugs for unpopular conditions are not unique to pharmaceutical markets.
These conditions arise, generically, whenever there are large fixed costs and preferences differ across consumers.
The process by which markets select which products to make causes markets to deliver more welfare to persons with common preferences than to persons with uncommon ones. As Spence (1977) has emphasized, there is no reason to expect the market to select the right mix of products in contexts of this sort. As we consider the sense of the ODA, we might also ask whether other policies aimed at raising the welfare of small consumer groups are also justified.
Some people believe that investment is not too sensitive to incentives (e.g. patent enforcement, price controls). They doubt that weakening patent protection or imposing price controls would significantly reduce investment in new drug development. Our evidence supports the hypothesis that at least one type of incentive (the extent of the market) has an important effect on the amount of investment. It may shed light on the effect of changes in other incentives on investment. For example, a governmentmandated 25% price reduction may have a similar effect on investment as a ("marketmandated") 25% reduction in prevalence.
IV. Conclusion
The results show two things. First, the results show that in this market, as in some others, supply-side nonconvexities give rise to an important relations hip between market size and consumption and, arguably, welfare. In this context, misery loves company.
This has broad implications. First, market size matters in providing incentives for product development.
Second, the prevailing, and generally implicit, view is that market allocation, unlike allocation through collective choice, gives each consumer whatever she wants, regardless of her fellow consumers' preferences. Given the large drug development costs, however, consumers see drugs developed for their conditions only as they make up large potential markets. Our results are, frankly, not surprising; but they do provide some evidence about how the mix of differentiated products selected in a market depends on the distribution of product-preferring types in the market.
Third, our results show that the Orphan Drug Law "works," in the sense that it has induced increased development of drugs targeted at small populations and that these populations are now more likely to take drugs. The policy is lauded, and other policies of this type (equalizing utility across large and small populations) exist. Perhaps most notably, the U.S. Postal Service has an explicit policy of charging the same rates for postage regardless of letter origin or destination within the U.S. If mail pricing were left entirely to the market, postage rates would presumably be lower for letters sent to and from densely populated areas. Under government provision, by contrast, administered rates are the same for consumers with substantially different costs of service, in densely and sparsely populated areas.
preferences differ across individuals, markets deliver fewer products and perhaps less satisfaction to small groups. In the pharmaceutical market this is deemed a bad feature of market outcomes; and policies have been devised to remedy the situation. Yet, there is no clear distinction between the economic circumstances of pharmaceutical markets and other large-fixed-cost markets. How widely such a policy rationale should be applied is an important remaining question for policymakers. Notes: weighted means are weighted by contemporaneous MD visits. 
